Canada-United States Law Journal
Volume 28

Issue

Article 15

January 2002

Discussion Following the Remarks of Mr. Stephenson and Dr.
Page
Discussion

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj
Part of the Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Discussion, Discussion Following the Remarks of Mr. Stephenson and Dr. Page, 28 Can.-U.S. L.J. 67
(2002)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol28/iss/15

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF MR.
STEPHENSON AND DR. PAGE
QUESTION, MR. ADLER: Thank you both for your presentations. We
now have about 30 minutes or so for questions and answers from the
audience. I am going to take the moderator's prerogative and ask the first
question.
Dale, we have heard the fact that some states are moving ahead with
programs of their own, whether they are voluntary programs, reporting
programs, or in some cases, even regulatory programs. Now, one of the odd
features of American environmental law is that while states are often
encouraged to go their own way or develop their own policies, in many
cases, efforts to do so are pre-empted by federal environmental legislation. I
was wondering if you had any comments on how aggressive states can be in
regulating greenhouse gas emissions without potentially running afoul of the
limits imposed by federal law?
ANSWER, MR. STEPHENSON: I think they can be fairly aggressive on
the issue because Congress has not really entered the field. If you look back
historically, the original emissions trading programs in the United States
were created at the state level. The first program was Ventura County
California, Air Management District creating the first SO 2 program.' I think
that states will lead again. Here in Ohio, one of the broadest emissions
trading programs is being developed today.2 It covers not only SO 2, NOx,
and other greenhouse gases, but also particulate matter. It is the broadest
program in the United States. I think you will see that kind of creativity
emerge until, ultimately, you force something to "gel" at the Federal level.
QUESTION, MR. ADLER: Robert, my question for you would be on the
issue of carbon "sinks," something that is certainly controversial in an area
where probably the United States and Canada agree; that is, because of net
forest growth in both countries, both countries are very interested in
receiving carbon sequestration that results from forest growth. I am
wondering, what are the prospects of global recognition of carbon
sequestration and sinks? I know that, in the past, the EU was not so
enthusiastic about this.3 I am wondering whether or not this position has
changed and what you see in the future for carbon sinks.
See, e.g., Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, at http://www.epa.gov/region09/
cross.pr/innovations/reclaim.html (last updated May 2, 2002).
2 See Richard Sandor, How I See It, ENVTL. FIN., May 2001, at 11.
3 See Brendan P. McGivern, Introductory Note, Conference of the Parties to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change: Kyoto Protocol, 37 I.L.M. 22, 25 (1998).
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ANSWER, DR. PAGE: Sinks is a really critical question, because it is
some of the comparative advantage on climate change for North America
both in terms of forest, but also in terms of agricultural soil. I was
tremendously relieved about the degree to which at Bonn and at Marrakech and I give Frank, Alan, and their colleagues enormous credit - the
understanding of the science behind sinks improved in terms of the
international negotiations. I believe that in terms of either Canada or the
United States, the current provisions within the Bonn and Marrakech
agreements are sufficient to allow us very considerable maneuver room. And
I was very hesitant before they were to achieve it. So I want to say,
congratulations to the negotiators in terms of doing it.
Secondly, I would say that it is in my European work, more so than my
North American work, that the whole attitude toward sinks, like the attitude
to emissions trading, is evolving rather positively. It is evolving not because
of love or the power of our arguments, but rather out of necessity with regard
to the shortages of credits that certain European countries will face. So
whether it is in Russia, which has enormous potential in terms of agricultural
sinks and forestry sinks, or the Ukraine or some of the other Eastern
European countries in a way that did not exist three years ago, there is now
an attractiveness for some Europeans to look at the whole issue of sinks in a
different way.
I served on the Canadian delegation for four successive years; I saw the
antagonism first hand, which was driven, partially, by the European
environmental groups. What we are trying to do in Canada now is to build a
national partnership on sinks that will lead with the best research in the world
on verification of what sinks do. There are some areas of sinks that at least
for the first commitment period are going to have very limited ability to
count for credits. Trees in northern Alberta grow very slowly. We have
forest fires. We have other issues of uncertainty with regard to them.
And so, have we won the battle on sinks completely? I do not think so.
But there is a greater willingness now to come at this from a scientific point
of view, as opposed to just an emotional point of view, when those in Europe
initially saw no use for sinks for themselves.
COMMENT, MR. ADLER: We are now going to turn to questions from
the audience.
QUESTION, MR. ROBBINS: I would like both speakers to comment on
something you alluded to, but I would like clarified. Do you believe that
emissions trading and other mechanisms after ratification will, in fact, force
American companies, especially multi-national companies, to comply with
what would have happened had we signed the Kyoto Protocol, and are there
big sections of American commerce and industry that would not be
compelled?
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ANSWER, MR. STEPHENSON: To the extent that multinationals are in
other countries, I think the countries where they reside will impose the
restrictions across the board. They will be able to reduce emissions on their
own by increasing your pollution control or your fuel burning or something.
They can buy a credit from somewhere else. Or, they can go into a foreign
country and put pollution control technologies or better power plants and
pick the lower hanging fruit, or they can put in carbon sinks. I think, one
way or the other, the companies that are operating within another country
that are subject to the Kyoto Protocol are going to have to participate in
meeting those objectives.
QUESTION, MR. ROBBINS: Is that going to have any effect on their
operations here in the U.S.?
ANSWER, MR. STEPHENSON: Maybe to the extent they do something
in the United States that they can use as a credit in those countries. I do not
see that as being a real strong force for behavior in the United States.
ANSWER, DR. PAGE: If I can, I will talk from my own experience in
the Pacific Northwest. We are certainly facing increased pressure from
environmental groups, from municipalities, and from states to take action on
climate change. This has nothing to do with Kyoto. This has to do with the
fact that in those areas of the United States, at least, there is a strong belief
that in absence of the U.S. joining Kyoto, a domestic or state-based program
is necessary. We are actually feeling more pressure right now in the Pacific
Northwest from the United States on climate change than we are feeling in
some parts of Canada.
I just say that because I think that is a very important understanding. We
are part of an organization in Washington of U.S. electrical utilities
concerned about the unlevel playing field, if I can use that term, between
some of us who are selling power into California from states that are
regulating CO2 competing with companies based in states that are not
regulating CO 2. We believe that is a competitive disadvantage that creates an
unlevel playing field. It is a kind of process that, with time, may see
increasing lobbying in Washington in the future for federal action here.
The last point I would make in connection with this is that we are very
aware, because we work with a number of U.S. companies, who for reasons
of regulatory compliance or of getting project approvals through, have then
adopted voluntary programs on climate change. Some of these are real, are
fairly costly, and are talking about reductions in emissions in the range of
millions of tons per year.
ANSWER, MR. STEPHENSON: One other issue on that note that I think
is important to note is that, although the United States is stepping away from
the international Protocol, it is aggressively pursuing bilateral agreements. It
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has entered one with Canada already4 . The U.S. has also entered into
bilateral agreements with Australia5 and with China,6 the latter of which is
the largest nemesis in the Kyoto issue. I think that you will see the
outgrowth of those bilateral agreements as movements towards greenhouse
gas emissions reductions at the specified level.
QUESTION, MR. KING: The Protocol will come into effect after 55
countries ratify it. What is going to specifically happen on that date? Is
there going to be an administrative staff, are they going to have some people
who are charged with the responsibility to see that these rules are going to be
enforced? I am interested in the mechanics of it.
ANSWER, DR. PAGE: If I can take a stab at it: when Kyoto comes into
effect, it is focused on the year 2008. What you are looking at if, say, Russia
and if Japan ratify, as I think they will in the next year and a half (Canada is
so small we are not really major player here), that happened, then you would
begin to see the planning for 2008. You would not see anything else other
than in the year 2005, when each of the Kyoto ratification countries must
report substantial progress in terms of moving towards the beginning of the
process itself, which will be in 2008. To my knowledge, other than the
reporting requirement, which may be very "loosey-goosey," there is nothing
before 2008. Even then, the accounting that will be done after that year is an
average of the emissions between 2008 and 2012, not an individual, year-byyear accounting. Thus, there is some time flexibility there.
ANSWER, MR. STEPHENSON:
There will be, of course, some
development of rules on how the trading programs will work, what sinks will
be allowed, and how projects in other countries will be implemented. I think
you already have a secretariat that is established for Framework Convention
on Climate Change (FCCC). I am sure that the FCCC will increase in
staffing to achieve the rule-making requirements.
QUESTION, MR. CLELAND: I would like either Bob or Dale, or both
of you, to comment on something that came up in the last session. Several
people, including Dale, commented about the Bush plan and the previous
speaker, for the most part, commented on it unfavorably. It does not take
very sophisticated arithmetic to conclude that the eighteen percent reduction
in emissions intensity is not much different or any different than business as
usual, but the idea of emissions intensity as a potential structure, as a
4 See, e.g., Protocol Amending the Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., 30 I.L.M. 685
(1999).
5 See Australia Signs Climate Pact With U.S., at http://sg.news.yahoo.com/020301/l/

2klk4.html (Mar. 1, 2001).

See Vice PresidentGore and PremierZhu Rongji Announce EnvironmentalAgreements
at U.S.-China Policy Forum on Environment and Development, at http://www.state.gov/
www/regions/eap/990409-us-chinaenviro.html (Apr. 9, 1999).
6
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potential architecture for emissions management, seems to me has some
evident attraction. It reduces or eliminates what might be a perverse
incentive against economic growth, which certainly holds an attraction, I
think, to the private sector and potentially to the less developed countries we
are very much wanting to get into this framework. I am wondering if one or
other of you would comment on that as an idea.
ANSWER, MR. STEPHENSON: I can go ahead and start. I think it is
probably interesting to note when you look at this where we fall in the first
place. In terms of greenhouse gas emissions per dollar of gross domestic
product, the United States ranks fourth in the world right now, behind New
Zealand, Australia and Canada.7 It is one of the lists where Canada beats us,
and I think that is probably why that metric was chosen to put us in the
middle of the list instead of the largest regular polluter out there on this area.
I think it is also a good metric to look at when you are comparing what is
happening, primarily in China and India. You have economies that want to
grow dramatically and the underlying force here is essentially that they have
their own Industrial Revolution, as we had ours. I think that is the bottom
line. You can do it by either not regulating them and letting them burn fossil
fuel at a greater rate with less controls, or you can give them the cash
directly; that is going to be a hard thing to achieve on the international stage,
and that is the tension that we are playing with. It is a good metric to use to
find out what really goes on, but you have some countries that want to catch
up on the gross domestic product that do not want to see that rubric put into
place.
ANSWER, DR. PAGE: Mike, if I can just briefly comment on this. In
terms of Alberta and Western Australia, which are two markets that we
serve, the whole issue of going at it from an emissions intensity point of view
is actually critical right now in terms of developing an effective system. Let
me tell you all why I say that. Today, the oil sands in Northern Alberta
provide about 500,000 barrels of oil a day to the U.S. market; 8 this number is
estimated to increase to about 2 million barrels a day to the U.S. by the year
2012. 9 What we are looking at is an enormous growth of natural gas and oil
7 See 1995 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Per Dollar GDP, at http://www.epa.gov/
globalwarrirnglpresentations/emissions/stock/95_ghg-gdp.pdf (last visited June 18, 2002).
8 Total oil experts from January through November 2001 averaged about 1.775 million
barrels per day. Canada Country Analysis Brief, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/
canada.html (last updated Feb. 28, 2002). Current production of oil sands in Alberta is about
665,000 barrels per day. Alberta Energy: Oil Sands, at http://www.energy.gov.ab.ca/com/
Sands/Introduction/Oil+Sands.htm (last visited June 19, 2002). About 60% of that total is
exported to the U.S. every day. See Alberta Energy: World Energy, at http://www.energy.gov.
ab.ca/com/Room/Key+Publications/World+Energy.htm.
9 Suncor Energy, the world's largest producer of crude oil from oil sands, currently
produces about 200,000 barrels per day. Recently, it announced a major capital investment in
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production largely in the export market. That is going to add enormously to
the Canadian overall totals that we have to meet under Kyoto. Under an
emission-intensity approach, you are given credit when you lower your rate
of emissions. I think, frankly, the Bush proposal is only the beginning of a
start in this direction, but it is one that I think would be viewed very
positively, especially in Western Canada. You can still have a formula for
conversion back to emissions; it is more difficult but you can still do that.
Secondly, I just would like to relate an anecdote from Western Australia.
We produce power there for the mining industry. When I met with Western
Australian government, the senior official in the energy department, Alan's
counterpart, said to me, you know, you Canadians do not understand the
problem we have.
And, I said, oh, I thought the discussions in Canberra and Perth, the
capital of Western Australia, were identical to the discussion in Alberta and
Ottawa. I felt very much at home in terms of the rhetoric that was flowing
back and forth.
He said, no, you missed my point. In Western Australia, the difference
between our 1990 baseline for Kyoto and our estimated business-as-usual for
2008 and 2012 is 142 percent, because most of the oil and gas industry in
Western Australia has sprung up since 1990. So, if you have an emissions
intensity system, you can demonstrate progress while at the same time not be
burdened by needing to worry about the effect of all that economic
expansion. For Australia, that is particularly important because there
competitors are north of them, in Indonesia and elsewhere, which will have
no such obligations under Kyoto; thus, the competitive issues are even more
pressing for Australia than they are Canada. I am not trying to suggest they
are not significant for Canada.
QUESTION, MR. ABRAHAMS: Let me preface my question and say I
am not a U.S. government plant here.
Actually, this question is for Mister Page. In one of your earlier
overheads, there was a statement that your company's goal was to eliminate
all greenhouse emissions by 2024, which sounds like a rather ambitious
program given the short time frame. Are there any company plans to either
share this technology with competitors in your country or in Canada or even
to sell the commercial rights, as this sounds too good to be true?
ANSWER, DR. PAGE: Well, it is too good to be true in a sense because
there is a lot of money and lot of work to be done in connection with this
goal. I will try to explain how this has happened, because the U.S.
an attempt to more than double its current capacity. See Kevin Nabholz, Suncor Energy's
Approach to Major Capital Projects, Remarks Before the Alberta Buyer-Seller Forum (Mar.
14, 2002) (transcript available at http://www.cme-mec.ca/ab/bsf2002/suncor.htm). It is likely
that other companies will follow Suncor's lead.

2002]

Stephenson & Page-DISCUSSION

Department of Energy has sponsored some of the work we are doing on this.
Certainly, if they continue through to the next phase, then that would be
something on which we might be willing to negotiate.
What we are proposing to do here is to change the combustion system
fundamentally, either through coal gasification or through CO 2 extraction
technologies. What would be here is essentially permanently sequestering
underground 100 percent of your emissions, not only CO 2, but also SO 2,
NOx, particulate and mercury. What we are trying to do is to run with the
concept that we are recycling our emissions back underground from where
they came. We believe that certain geological structures are appropriate for
this, and we are working with Canadian and international oil companies to do
just that. The way it is being structured in Canada, thanks to some of Alan's
colleagues in Natural Resources Canada, is that the Canadian government for
the provinces, some of the coal mining companies, and all of the thermal
utilities from Alberta to Nova Scotia are involved in what is called the
Canadian Clean Power Coalition. That technology, when developed, will be
available under license to any of them.
The levels of contribution will relate to the levels of emission. The
Government of Alberta and the federal government will be the leaders on the
government side. Using some of the lowest-sulfur coal in North America,
we believe that if we can meet the environmental and emission challenges of
coal, we can then have a legitimate right to the economic advantages for your
customers and your shareholders for preserving the future for coal. So the
onus is very much on us for the future of coal to develop that technology.
When I took this commitment to my Board of Directors, I was not
expecting approval, but I got it. I got it because the people around the Board
table though that it was so important to be demonstrating public credibility
with regards to the long-term goals as a company that they were prepared to
buy into it. We will achieve it because the initial technical work on
sequestration seems to indicate that it is feasible. That has all been done by
Pan Canadian and by U.S. oil companies for some time. 10 The critical issue
is the combustion technology, and that is where we are pouring our time,
money, and effort. Our estimate is for a retrofit-to-test in 2007, and a full
greenfield plant to be tested in 2010. It would then take until around 2012,
because you would have to take at least two years (especially with our
winters) to test the technology. It would then be available during the second
commitment period for the beginning of application to our existing plants
and would be done in sequence. That sequence will end in 2024, when that
capital stock renewal program would be completed.
1o See Climate Variability & Carbon Management Program, at http://www-esd.lbl.gov/
CLIMATE/ (last visited June 19, 2002).
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COMMENT, MR. NYMARK: Bob, as I interpret the last three bullets on
your last slide, you are proposing a NAFTA emissions trading system.
COMMENT, DR. PAGE: That is correct.
QUESTION, MR. NYMARK: Can you briefly describe the principal
design features of how that emissions trading system would work?
ANSWER, DR. PAGE: I will attempt to do it briefly, because there are a
whole series of technical issues that both and Alan I know well, with which I
will not bore others.
Now, under Kyoto, we would have no problems with Mexico transferring
credits either to an American or to a Canadian market. Moreover, there
would be no problems with Canadian-authorized Kyoto credits moving to the
American market. Where you have the difficulties is with non-Kyoto credits
within the American markets being accepted as Kyoto-verified credits within
the Canadian market.
First of all, the amount of demand for those credits, given that U.S. offset
projects are more expensive than Canadian and international projects, we do
not estimate that the number demanded will be huge, but it will be there. It
will be particularly important for companies like my own who, doing
methane-capture projects in the American Midwest or agricultural soils in
Iowa, possibly want to move those credits back to Canada. Now, under the
private-sector arrangements, there are extensive negotiations with some of
the largest financial institutions in the world going on right now. There
would be pooling arrangements so that American companies wishing to bring
CDM credits back from Latin America or from Africa or Asia and would put
those into a common pool within the United States. From there, those in the
United States wishing to transfer credits from the United States to the E.U.,
to Canada, or to Japan would have the option of paying a premium to
actually see within a large pooling arrangement the exchange of Kyoto
verified credits for American verified credits.
There are a couple other ways within the private sector we think we can
manage this. But this is a critical issue that you raise, and it is one which the
International Emissions Trading Association are spending a lot of time on
today, in North America, in Japan, and in Europe. If you let us do it, Alan,
we can do it.
QUESTION, MR. ROBINSON: I am going from the sublime, which is
your explanation of that very complex system, to something really ridiculous,
but let me confess: I do not do numbers. I cannot even balance my
bankbook. I do not even try. So this is a really naive question, but perhaps
you could help us understand how the world trading system works in the
context of this story that I have heard, which came from the U.S. coal
industry. Since Russia was at the nadir of its industrial production in 1990,
the value of credits that it has to sell are in hundreds of billions of dollars;
when this system happens, we are suddenly going to transfer in one huge
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lump all of the industrial growth since the Second World War from North
America to Russia in terms of hundreds of billions of dollars that they are
going to get for anything. But, in fact, on a net basis, since they start from
1990, they can do their industrial production and keep the money. I must
have got that wrong somehow.
ANSWER, DR. PAGE: This is a very important question. It is important
for two reasons. It is important because there is a great deal of mythology
involved with Russian hot air right now; and it is very important for me to
just try to take a minute and explain what "hot air" is. "Hot air" is the
difference in the level of economic activity between Russia in 1990, when its
economic system was still functioning reasonably well, and today, which,
following the enormous economic decline as Russia moved to a free
enterprise system, their economy declined and their emissions declined as a
direct result. Within the Kyoto Protocol, there is legitimate scope for the
trading in "hot air."
Our company will not touch hot air. I could have been in Moscow today.
The Russian government invited me to come because they are working on
this, and we are one of the consultants (the International Emissions Trading
Association) to their work. The Russians are very anxious to develop a
market for their hot air, but individual companies are being very careful,
because if you bring hot air back to, say, Alberta, we have to have the
approval of the Alberta government that those credits are legitimate. The
controversy with environmental groups that will be triggered by any use in a
regulatory process in North America of Russian hot air will be very
considerable. I will side with the environmental groups here, for this reason:
the Russian economy is expanding. Every time I am over there, I am seeing
more economic growth, and we deal with some of the largest companies in
Russia like Gazprom. As the Russian economy grows towards 2008 and
2012, that gap that they wanted to sell as hot air is going to decline. What
happens if those two lines cross in 2010? If they do, and you are a company
that has bought those credits, I am not sure the Russian government is going
to subsidize you. There is a "buyer-beware" understanding by virtually all
companies that I am aware of regarding the purchase of Russian hot air.
Alternatively, what is equally cheap, but much more buyable from a
regulatory or legal point of view, is the whole issue of projects within Russia.
There is enormous potential for pipelines and other projects in Russia. The
Gazprom system is very leaky - I am sorry, I hope I am not offending any
shareholders in the audience - and there is enormous potential for methane
capture from natural gas pipelines or from forestry, agriculture soil, or from
coalmines. There is a whole variety of options here.
Now, what you do is that you create a baseline before you begin; you
have independent scientific verification of that baseline. You then track, on a
yearly basis, the emissions following the measures you have taken to curb
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those emissions. Then, you bring all that evidence back - because I have to
justify to Alan that what I am doing with this is legitimate - and I have to
justify it to the Alberta government in a public process in which
environmental groups are involved. Unless I have reasonable scientific
evidence from third parties that are completely outside our company, then I
am going to have trouble justifying some of those measures.
The last point I make here is there are tremendous differences in the
prices that are being charged on this greenhouse gas emissions trading
market, and that the price differential is a direct product of the risks that you
take. What the Russian government is trying to do in the absence of large
demand for the United States is to figure out how they keep up with price for
both the project credits and the hot air.
COMMENT, MR. ADLER: This will be our last question.
QUESTION, MR. RUNNALS:
A question for both of you, but
principally for Bob: if Canada does not ratify Kyoto, the bind that the
government has created for itself, this whole question of credit for exports, if
you can foresee a NAFTA trading scheme, Bob, does credits for exports fit in
there? If it does, how is it accommodated, and how do you get credit for
exports to a non-Kyoto signatory in such a way that you justify
internationally?
ANSWER, DR. PAGE: The way we handle this right now is that we
have quite a bit of transborder transfer on carbon credits; we handle this from
a contractual point of view. We do not do it from a state-to-state point of
view, which is the position of the government of Canada. We do it from a
company-to-company point of view. The CO2 offsets credits are part of the
negotiation for the sale of that electricity or whatever it happens to be. It
becomes a normal part of your business operation; it is also a second revenue
source for you with green power and other things.
Now, the difficulty with this from a Canadian point of view (and this is
why Alan does not have as much flexibility on this as I do) is that we sell
natural gas on long-term contracts. We sell some electricity on long-term
contracts and we are locked in with those contracts for a much larger period
of time than I am in terms of what we are doing here. That is why what is
applicable in one area may not be applicable in another. However, you can
do it strictly from a contract point of view, and if we had a North American
emissions trading system, it would facilitate that in a normal private-sector
point of view as opposed to a state-to-state one.
QUESTION, MR. RUNNALS: But is it going to help him when it comes
to the end of the day of actually tallying up the Canadian score - the first
commitment period?
ANSWER, DR. PAGE: Well, any credits we bring back to Canada
through this arrangement, whether they are from Mexico or the United
States, would be authorized for Kyoto purposes.
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COMMENT, MR. ADLER: Please join me in thanking our panelists.
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